PART ONE: CAA3 and the Political Economy of Zimbabwe: Why the Working-Class Must Reject Constitutional Authoritarianism
CAA3 and the Political Economy of Zimbabwe: Why the Working-Class Must Reject Constitutional Authoritarianism
by Tafadzwa Choto
Part one: Constitutional Amendments in a Time of Crisis
The Constitutional Amendment Act No. 3 (CAA3) that was signed into law by President Mnangagwa on 7 July is being introduced at a time of deep political, economic, and social crisis, both in Zimbabwe and globally. Around the world, capitalism is generating growing inequality, instability, authoritarianism, and conflict. The resurgence of right-wing politics, exemplified by the return of Donald Trump in the United States, the war against Iran, and the continuing genocide in Palestine, reflects a global system in crisis. At the same time, the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, conflicts in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and numerous other conflicts across Africa, together with the increasing frequency of climate-related disasters, continue to displace millions of people and deepen poverty, unemployment, insecurity, and social suffering.
Zimbabwe is no exception. While a small elite accumulates unprecedented wealth, the majority of workers, the urban poor, youth, women, peasants, and informal traders face declining living standards, precarious livelihoods, and collapsing public services. CAA3 must therefore be understood not as a technical constitutional adjustment but as part of a broader project to consolidate elite power in the face of growing economic and social discontent.
CAA3: More Than an Extension of Mnangagwa’s Rule
It is important to capture the full significance of the proposed CAA3 amendments. The drive to amend the Constitution began within ZANU-PF structures, particularly at its 2024 Annual People’s Conference in Bulawayo and then the 2025 Conference in Mutare, to extend President Mnangagwa’s (ED) term to 2030. However, CAA3 goes much further than simply extending ED’s rule. It seeks to fundamentally alter the structure of the state and weaken democratic accountability.
The amendments strengthen executive power, reduce democratic checks and balances, and create conditions for a more centralised and less accountable state, creating more authoritarianism. The result would be a political system increasingly insulated from popular pressure at precisely the moment when economic hardship is generating growing social discontent.
The Rise of Zimbabwe’s New Capitalist Elite
To understand CAA3, it is necessary to situate it within the broader transformation of Zimbabwe’s political economy.
Over the past decade, Zimbabwe has witnessed the consolidation of a new capitalist class whose wealth and power are deeply intertwined with the state and the ruling party, ZANU-PF. While politically connected business interests existed under Mugabe, particularly through the plunder associated with Zimbabwe’s military intervention in the DRC and the looting of diamond revenues in Chiadzwa, the process of local capitalist accumulation has intensified under ED administration.
This emerging bourgeoisie—popularly referred to as the zvigananda, a term popularised by Vice-President Chiwenga—has amassed enormous wealth through privileged access to state resources, public procurement tenders, mining concessions, import licences, and other forms of political patronage. Their wealth is not primarily the product of productive investment or industrial development but of their proximity to political power.
The growing wealth of this elite has become increasingly visible, but so too has its arrogance. While nurses, teachers, and other workers struggle to survive on salaries that fail to meet basic needs, politically connected individuals openly display extraordinary wealth through lavish lifestyles and conspicuous consumption. Recently, public attention was drawn to the purchase of a Gulfstream G550 private jet, which Nehanda Radio reported cost US$34 million, by Wicknell Chivayo. Similar attention surrounded the expensive gifts at high-profile weddings involving the families of politically connected business figures, one for Kudakwashe Tagwirei’s son and the other for Wicknell Chivhayo’s sister, where luxury vehicles, hectares of land, and large cash gifts worth millions of US dollars were reportedly exchanged. Paul Tungwarara’s daughter, Tino, has also featured prominently in her shopping trips and publicised insulting charitable spectacles. The “Trabablas” treasure hunts, in which US$500 was hidden for hunting by the working class. Or the spectacle of nurses at Parirenyatwa Hospital dancing for cash gifts of US$100 while politically connected elites accumulated vast fortunes.
These incidents reveal more than simple displays of wealth. They reflect the growing confidence, impunity, and arrogance of an emerging capitalist class that increasingly treats extreme wealth as a badge of status to be publicly celebrated. At the same time, they expose the contempt with which these elites view the working class, turning poverty into spectacle and presenting acts of patronage as substitutes for social justice, while millions endure economic hardship, collapsing public services, and declining living standards.
As this class has grown economically stronger, it is increasingly seeking to secure its position politically. The objective is no longer merely to influence state policy but to deepen direct control over state institutions and safeguard its economic interests. CAA3 must therefore be understood as part of a broader project of class consolidation in which politically connected domestic capitalists, together with foreign investors operating in Zimbabwe, seek to entrench a political order that protects their economic interests from democratic scrutiny and popular pressure.
The slogan “Zimbabwe is Open for Business” has not translated into improved living standards for workers, peasants, youth, or the urban poor. Instead, it has facilitated a new phase of accumulation by politically connected elites who have gained privileged access to the country’s natural resources, public finances, and state contracts and tenders. In this context, sections of the emerging capitalist class have a material interest in supporting political arrangements that preserve their access to wealth and power.
It would be incorrect to deny that the government has achieved a degree of macroeconomic stabilisation compared to the years of hyperinflation and severe monetary instability. Rising gold export earnings, increased mining activity, tobacco production, and recent monetary reforms have contributed to periods of economic growth. The Economist April 2026 article titled “Political Gold” highlights that the IMF has put Zimbabwe’s growth for 2025 at 7.5%, almost double the African average.
Yet the central question is not whether growth has occurred, but who benefits from it. The current economic boom has accelerated the rise of a politically connected domestic bourgeoisie whose wealth is increasingly tied to state tenders, mining concessions, access to foreign currency, and political patronage. While a small elite accumulates vast fortunes, workers continue to face declining real wages, precarious employment, deteriorating public services, and rising living costs.
Economic growth has therefore not translated into broad-based social development. Instead, it has strengthened a capitalist class with a growing interest in protecting its wealth and political influence.
